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THE DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES, OUR COMMON LIFE AND
THE COMMON SCHOOL: TRUST IN DEMOCRACY:
ANABAPTISTS, ITALIAN AMERICANS, AND
SOLIDARITY
t
Thomas L. Shaffer

Consider two phrases in Professor Marie Failinger's charge to
those of us discussing Jeffrey Stout's Democracy and Tradition,1
October 28, 2005, at Hamline University: (i) "How would we construct
a real democratic sociality holding each other responsible for ethical life
that would warrant trust in democracy?... and, (ii) How do the
religious traditions help us reflect on this issue?"
My reflection, probably sectarian, refers more to where we come
from than to what we choose. The reference here is to three
communities, none of which is primarily concerned with "real
democratic sociality." But none of them is radically withdrawn; all three
of them contribute to the civil community, if only in the way that my
late friend and teacher John Howard Yoder meant when he said in our
conversations that, for all their separation, the Mennonites of Northern
Indiana were as concerned as anybody else with getting the potholes
filled.
The three communities I am thinking of are (a) the community of
believers formed in the tradition of the Radical Reformation, the
Anabaptists; (b) the community of Italian-American immigrants who
formed their children in a communal virtue they named rispetto-the
virtue that trains a person to be a member in a family; and then radiates
out-so that rispetto is practiced in ethnic community, in civil
community, nation, and world; and (c) the community contemplated in
modem Roman Catholic social teaching on solidarity, which is, among
other things, the virtue that trains members of the community to seek the
common good, the good that is common.
t B.A., J.D., LL.D.; Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, University of
Notre Dame. Notre Dame, Indiana. Panelist, Sixteenth Annual Symposium on Law, Religion and
Ethics, A Raft of Hope: Three Conversations about Liberal Democracy, God, and the Human
Good (St. Paul, Minn., Oct. 28, 2005) (audio available http:www.hamline.edu/law/jlr/
Symposiumlindex.htm (accessed July 13, 2006). This article is based on the author's presentation.
1. Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton U. Press 2004).
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Professor Failinger's charge invites these alternatives to the
democratic social order Jeffrey Stout described. From a believer's
perspective, the American civil community described by Stout and
invoked in Marie's phrase "real democratic sociality," seems to me to be
the community Gertrude Stein looked for and did not find in Oakland,
California: "There is no there there," she is said to have said.
Stout said the democratic community he had in mind is about
"holding one another responsible for... the sorts of people we
become." A believer will say, I think, that American democracy is not
rich enough, nor deep enough, nor warranting enough trust, to be a place
that forms its members in a way that will cause them to hold one another
responsible for the sorts of people they become, not as much as the Old
Order Amish in Lagrange County, Indiana, or among Italian
immigrants-people whose moral theology is that we are all in this
together. A believer who wants to enter the enterprise Stout describes
and Marie invokes would need to begin somewhere else. And even if
the place from which she comes meets Stein's "thereness" test, I doubt
that it gives her a way to rationally come to trust American democracy.
Which is to say that the richer her community is, the less likely it is to
foster trust in American democracy-except, perhaps, as to filling
potholes.
So that's one issue: whether the grand democratic communal vision
suggested by Stout's and Marie's phrases can be built on what we have,
now, in America. Whether there is any "there" here.
If not, perhaps the problem is that such a grand democratic
communal vision is merely pretentious. It may still be possible to get
the potholes full, and then we can look elsewhere for a community
where people can hold one another responsible for what is happening to
them. That's another issue.
John Howard Yoder, toward the end of his life, and particularly in
one of his last books, For the Nations,2 referred his Mennonite sisters
and brothers to a couple of phrases in the Book of the ProphetJeremiah:
To all of the exiles whom I have carried off from Jerusalem to
Babylon: Build houses and live in them; plant gardens and eat
their produce. Marry wives and beget sons and daughters...
Seek the welfare of any city to which I have carried you off, and
pray to the Lord for it; on its welfare your welfare will depend.3

2.
3.

John Howard Yoder, For the Nations (Eerdmans 1997).
Jer 29:4-8 (All Biblical citations are taken from the New English Bible.).
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My friend Ruth Jost, a Mennonite, a lawyer, and a mother,
interpreted that text for me. She said to me, as she went out to work
toward making Columbus, Ohio, safe for children: "There are some
things we do." (I suppose I must have appeared surprised at her civic
energy and Ruth felt she had to say something.)
But notice where the Ruth Josts of America come to decide on the
things they do. It is not done within "real democratic sociality." The
contributions from religion Marie Failinger invokes may sometimes
appear in the public square, but that is not where they come from.
Democratic sociality does not explain what Ruth Jost was doing in
Columbus. Nor does it explain statements of American Roman Catholic
bishops, in the space of a year, condemning America's foreign and
military policy and its capitalist proclivity. (Of course, origins may be
overcome by civic pressure. The public square didn't deal with, or even
need to deal with, the worry naval commanders were said to have about
Catholic officers who had been put in charge of nuclear weapons in
submarines; but the bishops' statement on nuclear weapons was not,
apparently, stronger than American civil religion.)
Looking ahead a bit, I notice that Italian-Americans have risked
and borne what American sociologists call "clannishness," and have
risked libelous identification with organized crime, risks not in service
to democratic sociality, but in order to carry the morality of the familythe morality of membership--into business and professional and civic
life. They bring that morality from their families to American
democracy. It doesn't come from Colorado Springs.
And, looking ahead to solidarity, it seems to me impossible to
locate enough coherent common good in what America is up to warrant
trust in American democracy, rather than in the other communal
traditions that are available to those who seek to form their children in
the virtues and point them to the common good. There is just not any
there here. I won't prove that negative, of course; there are people who
remain fond both of Oakland and of democratic sociality. I aspire only
to show you that there are alternatives.
THE ANABAPTISTS

The people who are in my mind's eye as the first of the three
alternative communities I am talking about are those Dorothy Pratt
describes in her wonderful book Shipshewana,4 about the Old Order

4. Dorothy 0. Pratt, Shipshewana (Quarry Books 2004).
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Amish in Northern Indiana. The mentor whose spirit hovers in my
mind, and who told my wife Nancy that I always get him wrong, is my
friend John Howard Yoder. But my insight into Anabaptist political
theology I owe not to Pratt or to Yoder, but to Professor Edward
Gaffney, who told me that the Swiss Anabaptists were not into a
theological quibble when they were put to death in the sixteenth century
for refusing to have their children baptized; what they were refusing for
their children was conscription into Christendom, he said. In the
memory of that refusal, the Amish and Mennonites of Lagrange County,
Indiana, seek to teach us in the mainline about holding one another
responsible for the sort of people we are becoming-we American
Christians-as we kill people to punish them for crime, or provoke the
deaths of thirty thousand civilians in an attempt to bring "real
democratic sociality" to Muslims in the Middle East.
Passing by the many distinctions Anabaptists practice--clothing,
boundaries (what they call "fences"), shunning, disdain for machinery
and public education, pacifism-the ideals of the modern Anabaptist
community are ideals in which members actively and advertently hold
one another responsible for the sorts of people they are becoming and
also, at the same time, act as a model community for the broader
"society." Part of their sociality, of their apostolate, to use the Catholic
word, is to show their neighbors in America how to live. If that is hard
to see and to accept when one is on the outside, it may be because the
Anabaptists do not seek political power, or even political influence. As
John Yoder said in our conversations, speaking of his community of
Indiana Anabaptists, "We can serve the world but we are not called to
rule it."
That's the community looking outward. Looking inward: In
Anabaptist soteriology, it is the community that is saved. And so it is
fundamental that the community be separated from and not corrupted by
American "democratic sociality." And it is fundamental for the
individual that she maintain her membership in the community as it is
saved, and she with it. That soteriology is at the heart of peculiar
customs and rules and "fences." It has carried with it a practice of social
stability that is remarkably local, is centered in the family, and builds on
a tradition of gender-specific tasks and roles that provides, in Pratt's
phrase, "a unique space for everyone."
Of course this local community exists in a wider civil order and its
fences have never kept "the world" entirely at bay. The practical
expression of this understanding is the extent to which the local
Anabaptist community functions communally within the civil
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community Stout and Failinger are interested in. Lagrange County thus
tends to deal with the Amish taken collectively, rather than with
individual members of the Amish congregation.
And vice versa:
Anabaptist response there has been communal response; Pratt believes
its survival is due to this communal cohesion-survival both in
maintaining communal integrity and in holding on to its members:
"[W]hen they acted collectively they managed to maintain the purity of
their faith," she says. When their young men were conscripted into farm
labor and sent to other states, and held there without pay, as an
alternative to military service in the world wars, the community
provided support for them. When the time comes for a group of families
within an Amish congregation to move far away (as they tend to do
when they run out of land), they go together; they move as a community,
sometimes to Latin America or to Canada. "They would not take
American culture with them to new homes," Pratt says, "but only their
Amish ways of life."
"As long as they are able to maintain their strict boundaries, yet
keep their sense of belonging to and of having a place within a
community," she says, "the Amish will not merely endure-they will
persist." As they have, back home in Indiana, for one hundred sixty-five
years. They have been and are an alternative to democratic sociality.
RISPETTO

Rispetto is a virtue, a good habit. The good habit that a person
learns, practices, teaches, and remembers from her membership in her
family. It is the good habit that trains a person in the skills needed for
being a member without losing her dignity. One of the Italian-American
lawyers who contributed to Mary Shaffer's and my book on ItalianAmerican lawyers and their communities told us about it:
I can remember overhearing heated discussions (which in a nonItalian family would have been flat-out arguments) in which
certain of my uncles were promoting Franklin D. Roosevelt for
sainthood, while others wanted him cast into the fiery depths. One
of my uncles was as close to a Marxist as anyone I have ever
known, and other members of my family were probably John
Birchers.
Interestingly, though, none of the political
disagreements affected the base of affection that everyone had for
one another. The trouble, of course, is recognizing that a friendly
discussion between Italians can often appear quite close to open
warfare when seen and heard by people of other ethnic
backgrounds.
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The word "affection" in that account is not incidental. Another of
our contributors said, "My family was an emotional support group and
therapy center, with few secrets and frequent, open discussions about the
range of human feelings, and their expression and resolution." Affection
is central, and the affection in rispetto widens, so that it operates
communally: The sentimental movie Moonstruck tells about three
generations in an Italian-American family and shows how the sense of
family operating in an Italian-American neighborhood reaches out from
blood relatives to include the grocer around the comer, business
customers, suitors and the rivals of suitors, and even a potential motherin-law on her deathbed in Sicily. At the end of the story, tensions in
temporary abeyance, suitor, rival, grocer, and all three generations of
blood relatives toast their stubborn harmony with good red table wine, as
they say together: Viva lafamiglia!
Rispetto as a virtue in Aristotelian calculation is the middle way
between the mawkish sentimentality that so often betrays the importance
of families in popular culture, and the political oppression that uses
family feeling to promote oppression, the product of what one species of
political conservatives claim to achieve through "focus" and others
name "family values." In the middle, rispetto, learned in the family, is
an Aristotelian way of looking at virtue in political culture. It is, finally,
not something a person gets just by being rational; as Michael Novak
puts it, it is not what a person chooses but what a person comes home
to.5
Rispetto in Italian-American political culture is the product of a
development that began within the late nineteenth century flood of
impoverished immigrants from Calabria, Abruzzi, and Sicily and ended
during the period after World War II when third generation ItalianAmericans started going to college (thanks to the G.I. Bill). Eventually,
5. This section is drawn from the article by my daughter Mary and me, Thomas L. Shaffer &
Mary M. Shaffer, Characterand Community: Rispetto as a Virtue in the Tradition of ItalianAmerican Lawyers, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 838 (1989), adapted as part of our book Thomas L.
Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, American Lawyers and Their Communities (U. Notre Dame Press
1991). First-person contributions, not attributed for the most part, were from students, lawyers,
and colleagues we shared our teaching lives with. I am aware that a similar moral focus could be
attempted for other immigrant groups; one reason we chose Italians is that Mary speaks and writes
and teaches Italian and is richly acquainted with many Italians, some in the United States, some in
Italy, some in France. What has been important, I think, is that we did our work with a lateimmigrant group. Older immigrant groups-the Irish, the Germans, the English and Welsh and
Scots from whom our family comes-have, much more than the Italians, lost their immigrant
edge, and in our case have seen it replaced with the residues of the western frontier in North
America. I can do much more toward explaining myself as I think about being the only male in
three generations of my family who is not a cowboy than I can with the fact that four of my greatgrandparents came from Ireland and Wales.
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from there it became a late arriving part of a community that could be
addressed in place and invited to join democratic sociality. The virtue of
rispetto would (as nearly as I can tell) not necessarily have led to
democratic sociality. My reading, rather, is that, as the Italians joined
the audience Stout describes in America; and in his own neighborhood,
they brought with them the practice of rispetto, remembering rispetto.
They had learned the virtue at home and practiced it and trained
themselves in its practice as they encountered other people in their "little
Italys" then in their larger and more mixed neighborhoods, then in their
towns and then, as places for regrouping, in their broader ethnic and
religious communities. (A treatise could be written on where the word
paesano came from and what it has meant among Italian Americans.
(Paesemeans place.))
When Italians in America moved toward the possibility of
democratic sociality-much later, by the way, than the late immigrant
Irish and Jews had-their early emissaries included Mario Cuomo,
Geraldine Ferraro, John Pastore, Antonin Scalia, and Salvatore Cotillo.
Always and in each case, as I read their stories, they came into
"democratic sociality" with wariness, but also with the preservation of
dignity and respect and respect for the family-dimensions of the virtue
of rispetto their ancestors had practiced over centuries of oppression in
Calabria, Abruzzi, Sicily, and in immigrant ghettos in the United States.
The immigrants came here for bread and for work-pane e lavoro.
Gradually, I suppose, they encountered the presence or the possibility of
a community in America that was not all Italian. Gradually they met
instruction and argument from the descendants of the Enlightenment we
live among-although they resisted civic education and public education
rather longer than their counterparts from other mother countries. They
resisted, as the Anabaptists did, with immigrant virtues such as rispetto,
the culture and the pallid public philosophy they found in America.
Letters home from the Italian immigrants said Americans lacked skills in
manners, bearing, and language. "Dignity has no place in life here," one
letter-writer said. Another said he found America materialistic and
revolting, and Americans "colorless, unsalted... without culture," cold
and unemotional, "pickled in the sour juices of Puritanism." "Joy,"
another wrote, "is a fruit the Americans eat green-without flavor."
Senza sapore.
Half of the immigrants returned to Italy. Mary and I dealt, as we
learned and wrote about Italian-Americans, with the descendants of the
other half, those who, in our reading, first identified for us the virtue of
rispetto, the skill for being members. It is an Italian-American thing.
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And for present purposes, it points to a negative thing. Rispetto shows
how the usual communitarian argument in jurisprudence, in social
ethics, and in professional ethics is not persuasive when made to a
people who do not perceive deeply enough that America is a community
that sustains virtues learned in the family: Rispetto seems to say that a
person has either to hold on to what he learned at home or become the
lonely automaton that the Enlightenment tells him he has to be in order
to have rights.
It is not that the immigrant virtues resist community; in fact, they
build community. But they also show how the presence or possibility of
community in America, standing all by itself, is not evident enough to
support the argument that we have moral obligations to reach people
who do not appear in our domestic lives; nor is it evident enough,
standing all by itself, to support the premise or assumption that we are
communal creatures who ought to remember or find or revive or create
such a community.
At the end of Democracy and Tradition, Jeffrey Stout talks about
his own neighborhood-a rich mixture of economic and ethnic groups
pulling together, for the moment, to resist the expansion of a hospital.
"Closest to the hospital lies a mainly Italian neighborhood," he says,
founded by skilled stone carvers who came here many decades
back, when the university that employs me chose to build Gothic
buildings that ape the architecture of Oxford and Cambridge ....
By communitarian standards, I suppose my interlocking
neighborhoods are not a community at all. Perhaps the Italian
neighborhood, taken by itself, might come close to qualifying ....
He doesn't say how that is so for the Italians, or how that has
happened among people who know how to build something that does
not look like itself. I would like to know more about that. It might
describe this second of my alternatives to democratic sociality.
SOLIDARITY

The problem I have in describing solidarity as an alternative to
liberal democratic sociality is that solidarity, as presented in academic
discourse, by popes and professors, is ponderously inaccessible-a
discouraging place to work on the happy insight that we're all in this
thing together-which is what solidarity means. I am going to try here
to notice the central ideas as they appear in Catholic Social Teaching,
and then try to notice how much the central ideas get expressed in
tensions, some of them pugnacious, many of them relatively concrete,
and few of them as ponderous as the theological discussions are.
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(Maybe the way to get to solidarity is to blunder right into the middle of
the tensions. We Hoosier lawyers tend to do that.)
The central ideas are interdependence and common good: John
Paul II wrote that human interdependence is a fact but also
Interdependence becomes a
more than the factual situation ....
moral category when we are aware of it as a system determining
relationships in the contemporary world in its economic, cultural,
political, and religious elements. The correlative response to
interdependence as a moral category is the moral attitude or virtue
of solidarity.
The purpose and goal of the virtue of solidarity is the common
good-with as much substance and weight put on "common" as the
moralist puts on "good": common good. Radically so, as in what the
tradition says about Yom Kippur (this by way of reflection on the
prayer, "Blessed are you, 0 God, who have guided us and made us a
holy people"):
The Confession is made by the whole Community collectively;
and those who have not themselves committed the sins mentioned
in the confession regret that they were unable to prevent them from
being committed by others.6
As Garrison Keillor put it last year, on Yom Kippur the confessions are
all in the plural.
Sometimes the commonality reminds me of rispetto. Mary's and
my Italian friends might be a bit slow to quote that point from an
encyclical by a Polish pope, but Charles Curran, Kenneth Himes, and
Thomas Shannon, commenting on John Paul's encyclical letter On
Social Concern, (Solicitudo Rei Socialis), are not. "Solidarity," they
write,
is the attitude of a community in which the common good
conditions and initiates participation, and at the same time calls for
the constant readiness of each person to accept and to realize one's
share in the community because of membership in the community.
Robert F. Kennedy spoke of each individual act of courage and belief as
a tiny ripple of hope, "and crossing each other from a million different
centers of energy and daring those ripples build a current which can
sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance." He said
that in Cape Town in 1966.

6. The Pentateuch and Hafiorahs 523, n. 27 (J.H. Hertz ed., 2d ed., Soncino 1987). See also
Prayers of Repentance on the Day of Atonement, in Praying with the Jewish Tradition 87-98
(Elias Kopciowski ed., Paula Clifford trans., Eerdmans 1997).
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Sometimes the description sounds like mystical psychology, Jung
on a foggy day. Matthew Lamb speaks of "a metaphysics of human
solidarity" that
needs a cognitional theory or epistemology to advance an
understanding of human intelligence as not just a Cartesian
thinking ego but as intrinsically acts of understanding and
knowing in solidarity with all intelligence. Mind is public and
communicative by nature.
Mind. Just one. And we're all in it together.
And then there are the tensions. To begin in the middle of them,
there is John Yoder's insight that democratic discourse-"democratic
sociality" we are calling it-is usually about coercion, and discussion of
interdependence is usually about power. So much of it comes down to
what the Hoosier philosopher Abe Martin said about principles:
"Whenever anybody says to me, it's not the money; it's the principle of
the thing-it's the money."
In his book To Hear the Word, published after he died, John
preached a bit in that Abe Martin mood to his Anabaptist brothers and
sisters-preached about misuse of what the Prophet Jeremiah said about
seeking in peace the welfare of the country to which the Lord carried
them off. John said he sought to ponder "what 'trusting God' would
mean in concrete social terms," that is, in a community that claimed to
be concerned for the sorts of people its people were becoming. 7
It would mean that our calculations of the common good would not
begin by privileging our own perspective, and would not be used to
assign to ourselves or to our party the authority to impose our vision or
our rights on others by authority or by applying greater power. To trust
God is then to trust in dialogue and due process, repentance and the
common search.
This is a mixture of rispetto and solidarity in simple, clear
Anabaptist dress.
John wrote earlier, with advertent attention to the social ethics of
Protestantism, on what he called "the hermeneutics of peoplehood." The
corrective against the dangers of power and coercion, he taught there,
rests on such practices as those that assure everyone in the community
has a chance to speak and the duty of everyone in the community to
listen. 8 In To Hear the Word he made the point in a more sectarian

7. John Howard Yoder, To Hear the Word (Wipf& Stock Publishers 2001).
8. John Howard Yoder, The Hermeneutics of Peoplehood: A Protestant Perspective on
PracticalMoral Reasoning, 10 J. Relig. Ethics 40 (1982).
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manner:
There is a deep commonality between the daring to share that is
enjoined for the disciples' economic life ... and the love for
enemy that is commended in the realm of conflict .... Both risk
themselves at the hand of open process of which one is ready to
relinquish control .... Heralding the kingdom (Matt 3:2; 4:17;
10.7) and the commitment in prayer to its coming (6:10) do not
replace sober planning with blind faith, nor social analysis with
unthinking obedience. They change the calculation of common
good. They place realism in a framework of faith and hope.
Kristin Heyer's recent essay on Catholic social ethics in the United
States compares the social ethics of Bryan Hehir with those of my
colleague and friend Michael Baxter. Hehir is identified with the
Harvard Divinity School and (thereby) with the mainline church. In
Heyer's reading Hehir expounds a school of solidarity she calls "the
public
church"--pluralistic,
collaborative,
what Baxter calls
"Americanist," and concerned (Baxter says) more with citizenship than
with discipleship. The Christian witness Hehir teaches and practices is
witness to policy makers, especially those who live and work in
Washington, D.C.9
My colleague Baxter, on the other hand, spends much of his time at
the Catholic Worker House he founded, perhaps in violation of
gentrified zoning regulations, on West Washington Street, in downtown
South Bend. He seeks not a public church but a contrast society-an
alternative. Mike is influenced by Dorothy Day and by his Methodist
teacher Stanley Hauerwas. He sees himself and his followers as alien,
radical, accusatory, and confrontive.
The author of the essay, Kristin Heyer, teaches theology at Loyola
Marymount University in Los Angeles. She says of Hehir the publicchurch theologian that he seeks first "to understand the world in all of its
complexity . . . in its secularity." He is restless, she says, "about its
infirmities and limitations." He feels "driven to lay hands on it, which is
what Catholic social ethics calls the world to do." That says about as
clearly as she could that she finds Hehir's "public church" to be about
power. Yoder would understand.
She says of Baxter that he takes aim at "social networks produced
by advanced capitalism, the 'world' of autonomous individualism, mass

9. Kristin E. Heyer, Bridging the Divide in Contemporary U.S. Catholic Social Ethics, 66
Theological Stud. 401 (2005).
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culture, economic oppression, and the rule of secular power." (Mike
Baxter defines in that way what he means when he says "the world."
The Amish in Lagrange County would understand.) Baxter says that
Christian responsibility is not about making this system work, or work
better, but rather it is "performing the works of mercy on behalf of the
poor, the homeless, and others of the least among us who are Christ in
our midst." Justice, he says, is not to be "applied" to social problems; it
is to be "embodied."
These are Anabaptist insights, but Baxter is not an Anabaptist,
stepping aside and building his apostolate quietly-as if he were behind
a horse-drawn plow in Lagrange County. Solidarity, to him, is anger at
the way things are in Americaa fundamentally unjust and corrupt set of institutions whose
primary function is to preserve the interests of the ruling class, by
coercive and violent means if necessary, and there will always
come a time when it is necessary.
My friend Failinger's third question, in her charge to us, was how
the religious traditions help us to reflect on "real democratic sociality."
My interest is not-any more than John Yoder's was, or Mike Baxter's
interest is-in how to make American political and economic
dispositions work better. I share Stout's concern, and, I trust, yours in
figuring out whether we are making one another better people, but my
hope for democracy in America as a place to do that is thin. I am
suggesting that we look somewhere else-to the Amish even, to ItalianAmericans, to the fact of our interdependence and the ethical principle
that we are all in this thing together.
Reflection on the virtue of solidarity-on not only helping one
another out, but looking out for one another and noticing the sorts of
persons we are becoming as we look out for one another-presents a
forest of tensions. I enjoy exploring them with Heyer and Hehir and
Baxter because they are sister and brothers in the church and should
behave, finally, as they would after dinner in an Italian house-in the
neighborhood caf6 in Moonstruck maybe. After a dinner such as that,
smiling in the middle of a forest of tensions may be about right.
Matthew Lamb challenges American democratic sociality,
probably more than he has in mind to do, when he writes: "Solidarity is
more than mutual assistance. As individuals we are indeed limited in
our humanity, but as persons we are blessed by our very ability to make
up for one another's insufficiencies."
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